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Recently, a new signal security system called TDCEA (two-dimensional circulation encryption algorithm) was proposed for real-
time multimedia data transmission. This paper gives a comprehensive analysis on the security of TDCEA. The following security
problems are found: (1) there exist some essential security defects in TDCEA; (2) two known-plaintext attacks can break TDCEA;
(3) the chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext versions of the aforementioned two known-plaintext attacks can break TDCEA
even with a smaller complexity and a better performance. Some experiments are given to show the security defects of TDCEA and
the feasibility of the proposed known-plaintext attacks. As a conclusion, TDCEA is not suitable for applications that require a high
level of security.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In today’s digital world, the security of multimedia data,
for example, digital speech, image and video files, becomes
more and more important due to their frequent transmis-
sion over open networks. In some real applications, such as
pay-TV, medical imaging systems, military image/database
communications, and confidential video conferences, highly
secure and reliable storage and transmission of multime-
dia data are needed. To fulfill such a demand, many en-
cryption schemes have been proposed as possible solutions
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Meanwhile,
cryptanalysis work has also been developed, and some of the
proposed schemes have been found to be insecure [9, 10, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. For a comprehensive
survey of the state-of-the-art of image and video encryption,
see [26].
The present paper focuses on a new signal security sys-
tem recently proposed in [1, 2], which is called the two-
dimensional circulation encryption algorithm (TDCEA). In
fact, TDCEA is an enhanced version of a previous image en-
cryption scheme proposed by the same authors in [3, 4],
named BRIE (bit recirculation image encryption), which is
the 1D counterpart of TDCEA. The original BRIE scheme
has been successfully cryptanalyzed in [19], showing its in-
security against known-/chosen-plaintext attacks. Although
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TDCEA is more complicated than BRIE by using 2D per-
mutations, this paper will point out that such a 2D general-
ization cannot enhance the security of BRIE against known-
/chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks. In addition,
it will be shown that the security of TDCEA against brute-
force attack was much overestimated in [1, 2]. Essentially,
TDCEA is a permutation-only image cipher, which has been
known to be insecure against known-/chosen-plaintext at-
tacks [15, 16, 23, 25].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section briefly introduces TDCEA and its 1D version BRIE.
Section 3 discusses some general security defects of TDCEA.
Two known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks are given
in Sections 4 and 5, respectively, with some experimental re-
sults for verification. Section 6 briefly discusses the chosen-
ciphertext attack, a natural and simple generalization of the
chosen-plaintext attack. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. TDCEA
The basic idea used in TDCEA is secret bit rotations of every
64 consecutive bits (of 8 consecutive pixels), which are con-
trolled by a chaotic pseudorandom binary sequence (PRBS).
BRIE is the simplified version of TDCEA, by rotating only
8 bits in each pixel. To facilitate the description of TDCEA
and BRIE, it is assumed that the plain image has sizeM ×N ,
whereM is the height and N is the width of the image.
2.1. Definitions and notations
First, some definitions and notations are given in order to
introduce TDCEA and BRIE. Assuming two matricesM and
M′ of size m × n, where m is the height and n is the width,
two mapping operations are defined as follows.
(i) The horizontal rotation mapping, Rotate X
p,r
i : M →
M′ (0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1), is defined to circularly rotate the
ith row of M, in the left (when p = 1) or right (when
p = 0) direction, by r elements.
(ii) The vertical rotation mapping, RotateY
q,s
j : M → M′
(0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1), is defined to circularly rotate the jth
column ofM, in the up (when q = 1) or down (when
q = 0) direction, by s elements.
WhenM is a 1×n vector, the 1D version of the above 2D
rotation mapping is denoted by ROLR
q
p : M → M′, which
is defined to circularly rotate M in the left (when p = 0) or
right (when p = 1) direction, by q elements.
2.2. The 1D version of TDCEA-BRIE
Assuming the plain image is f = [ f (x, y)]M−1,N−1x=0,y=0 and the
cipher image is f ′ = [ f ′(x, y)]M−1,N−1x=0,y=0 , BRIE is described as
follows [3, 4].
(i) The secret key: two integers α, β, and the initial condi-
tion x(0) ∈ (0, 1) of the following chaotic logistic map:
x(k + 1) = µ · x(k) · (1− x(k)). (1)
(ii) The initialization procedure: run the chaotic logis-
tic map from x(0) to generate a chaotic sequence,
{x(k)}(MN+1)/8−1k=0 , where a denotes the smallest in-
teger that is not less than a. From the 8-bit binary rep-




b(8k + i) · 2−i−1
= 0.b(8k + 0)b(8k + 1) · · · b(8k + 7),
(2)
a PRBS is derived, {b(k)}MNk=0.
(iii) The encryption procedure: for the plain pixel f (x, y) =∑7
i=0 bi · 2i, the corresponding cipher pixel f ′(x, y) =∑7
i=0 b
′
i · 2i is determined by the following equation:
M′ = ROLRqp(M), (3)
where p = b(N ·x+ y), q = α+β ·b(N ·x+ y+1), and
M,M′ are two 1× 8 bit matrices:M = [b7, b6, . . . , b0],
M′ = [b′7, b′6, . . . , b′0].
(iv) The decryption procedure is denoted by
M = ROLRq1−p(M′) = ROLR8−qp (M′). (4)
In [19], BRIE was successfully cryptanalyzed and the fol-
lowing security problems were pointed out.
(1) The key space is too small and the security against the
brute-force attack was much overestimated.
(2) There exist some essential defects, which makes it pos-
sible for an attacker to get some visual information of
the plain image by observing the cipher image.
(3) BRIE is not secure against known-/chosen-plaintext
attacks, since only one known/chosen plain image is
enough to get an equivalent key, a mask array Q =
[q(x, y)]M−1,N−1x=0,y=0 , where q(x, y) satisfies
M′ = ROLRq(x,y)0 (M),
M = ROLRq(x,y)1 (M′) = ROLR8−q(x,y)0 (M′).
(5)
(4) It is easy to get the subkeys α, β and the most signif-
icant 8 bits of the chaotic state x(k), as a replacement
of the subkey x(0), from the mask array Q obtained
above.
2.3. TDCEA
TDCEA [1, 2] is an enhanced version of BRIE, by extending
the bit rotation operations from one pixel to 8 consecutive
pixels, and from two directions (left and right) to four direc-
tions (left, right, up, and down).
TDCEA encrypts a plain image block by block, where
each block contains 8 consecutive pixels. To simplify the fol-
lowing description, without loss of generality, assume that
MN can be divided by 8. Consider the 2D plain image
{ f (x, y)}M−1,N−1x=0,y=0 as a 1D signal { f (l)}MN−1l=0 by scanning it
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: A special test image, “test pattern,” encrypted by TDCEA. (a) The plain image. (b) The cipher image.
in raster order.1 Then, the plain image can be divided into
MN/8 blocks:
{








f (8)(k) = { f (8k + 0), . . . , f (8k + i), . . . , f (8k + 7)}. (7)
Rewrite each block f (8)(k) as an 8 × 8 bit matrix Mk =
[Mk(i, j)]
7,7
i=0, j=0, by assigning the 64 bits in the current block
in the raster order f (8k + i) =∑7j=0Mk(i, j) · 2 j . In the same
way, the 8 pixels of each block of the cipher image can be rep-
resented by an 8× 8 bit matrixM′k = [M′k(i, j)]7,7i=0, j=0, where
f ′(8k+ i) =∑7j=0M′k(i, j)·2 j . Based on the matrix represen-
tations of the plain/cipher images, the working mechanism
of TDCEA can be described as follows.
(i) The secret key: two integers α, β, the initial condition
x(0), and the control parameter µ of the logistic map
(1), where 0 < α < 8, 0 ≤ β < 8 and 0 < α + β < 8.
(ii) The initialization procedure: run the logistic map
starting from x(0) to generate a chaotic sequence,
{x(k)}MN/8−1k=0 , and then extract the 17-bit representa-
tion of x(k) to yield a PRBS, {b(i)}17MN/8−1i=0 . In the
hardware implementation given in [1, 2], the logistic
map is realized in 17-bit fixed-point arithmetic.
(iii) The encryption procedure.
Step (1). Horizontal rotations: for i = 0 ∼ 7 (i.e., for each
value of i from 0 to 7, the same hereinafter) do
M∗k = Rotate Xp,ri (Mk), where p = b(17k + i)
and r = α + β · b(17k + i + 1).





k ), where q = b(17k + 8 + j) and
s = α + β · b(17k + 9 + j).
(iv) The decryption procedure is a simple reversion of the
above encryption procedure, as follows.
1Note that in [1, 2] TDCEA is described directly for 1D signals. In this
paper, we prefer to explicitly mention the transform from 2D images to 1D
signals, so as to emphasize the relation between BRIE and TDCEA (which is
not mentioned in [1, 2]).





k), where q = 1 − b(17k + 8 + j)
and s = α + β · b(17k + 9 + j).





k ), where p = 1 − b(17k + i) and
r = α + β · b(17k + i + 1).
3. SOME SECURITY DEFECTS OF TDCEA
3.1. Essential defects of circulations
In [19], some essential defects of the ROLR operation were
found: (1) some plain pixels may keep unchanged after en-
cryption, so the plain image will roughly emerge if there are
too many such pixels; (2) for a subregion in the plain im-
age with a fixed gray value, at most eight gray values2 will be
contained in the corresponding subregion of the cipher im-
age, which will lead the edge of this subregion to appear in
the cipher image. The second fact is also true for subregions
with close pixel values.
Although TDCEA extends the shift operation to two di-
mensions, the above defects of ROLR cannot be completely
removed. As an extreme example, when all elements in Mk
are 0-bits or 1-bits, it is obvious that M′k ≡ Mk, which
means TDCEA cannot encrypt blocks with fixed pixel value
0 (black) or 255 (white) at all. To test the performance of
TDCEA compared with BRIE, we have encrypted the same
test image used in [19] for BRIE, with the following pa-
rameters: (α,β) = (2, 4), x(0) = 34816/217 ≈ 0.2656,
µ = 128317/215 ≈ 3.9159. The encryption result is shown
in Figure 1, from which one can see that the 16 squares in
the plain image remain fixed in the cipher image, though the
fixed gray values have been changed for most squares. Com-
paring this result with those given in [19, Figure 1], it is ob-
vious that the security defects of BRIE are not enhanced by
TDCEA.
As a second example to test the possible enhancement
of TDCEA on the BRIE security, we also tested the encryp-
tion performance of TDCEA on some general natural images
2For some pixel values, the number of diﬀerent cipher pixel values is even
smaller, which may be 1, 2, or 4 [19, Section 3.1].
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Figure 2: Two natural images, House and Cameraman, encrypted by TDCEA, with (α,β) = (5, 1), x(0) = 33578/217 ≈ 0.2562, and
µ = 129518/215 ≈ 3.9526. (a) House. (b) Encrypted House. (c) Cameraman. (d) Encrypted Cameraman.
containing many smooth areas. As known, the pixels within
a smooth area generally have close pixel values, which are
found similar to the squares with fixed gray values shown in
Figure 1 when TDCEA is applied for encryption. Two im-
ages, “House” and “Cameraman,” are selected for testing.
The experimental results are shown in Figure 2, from which
one can seemany important edges of the plain images emerg-
ing in the cipher images. In this experiment, the parameters
of TDCEA are as follows: (α,β) = (5, 1), x(0) = 33578/217 ≈
0.2562, and µ = 129518/215 ≈ 3.9526.
3.2. Security problem of α, β
In [1, 2], the values of α and β are constrained by 0 < α < 8,
0 ≤ β < 8, and 0 < α + β < 8. Thus, the number of all pos-
sible values of (α,β) is 7 + 6 + · · · + 2 + 1 = 28. However,
similar to the case of BRIE, α and β should also obey the fol-
lowing rule pointed out in [19]: α = 1, 7 or α + β = 1, 7.
If this rule is not satisfied, then there only exist 1-bit circu-
lar rotation operations, since Rotate X
p,1
i = Rotate Xp,7i and
Rotate Y
q,1
j = Rotate Yq,7j . Generally speaking, 1-bit circu-
lar rotations are not good enough to eﬀectively encrypt the
plain image, and some visual information may leak from the
cipher image. When (α,β) = (1, 6), x(0) = 33578/217 ≈
0.2562, µ = 129518/215 ≈ 3.9526, the encryption results
of two plain images, House and Cameraman, are shown in
Figure 3. It can be seen that the visual information contained
in the cipher images is so much (even more than that in
Figure 2) that the plain images can be obviously guessed. Ex-
cluding the three values of (α,β) that violate the above rule,
(1, 0), (1, 6), (7, 0), the number of all “good” values of (α,β)
is only 25 (= 28− 3).
3.3. Low practical security against brute-force attacks
In [1, 2], it was claimed that the complexity of TDCEA
against brute-force attack is O(217MN/8) since 17MN/8 secret
bits are used in the encryption/decryption procedures. How-
ever, this statement is not true due to the following reason:
all 17MN/8 bits are uniquely determined by the initial con-
dition x(0) and the control parameter µ of the logistic map
(1), which have only 34 secret bits. Moreover, not all values
of µ can ensure the chaoticity of the logistic map [27], so we
can assure that the number of possible diﬀerent chaotic bit
sequences is smaller than 234.
Considering that the computational complexity of TD-
CEA is O(MN), that is, 49MN operations of all kinds [1,
Section 2.5], and the number of all possible values of (α,β)
is 25, the total complexity against the brute-force attack is
O(234 · 25 · 49MN) ≈ O(244MN). For a typical image of
size 256 × 256, the complexity is about O(260), which is
much smaller than O(217MN/8) = O(2139264), the complexity
claimed in [1, 2]. Obviously, the security of TDCEA against
brute-force attacks was overestimated too much in [1, 2].
4. KNOWN-PLAINTEXT ATTACKS
The known-plaintext attack is the attack of reconstructing
the secret key or its equivalent with some known plaintexts
and their corresponding ciphertexts, which is practical and
occurs more andmore frequently in today’s networked world
[28]. Although it was claimed that TDCEA can eﬃciently re-
sist this kind of attacks [1, Section 2.6], we propose two dif-
ferent known-plaintext attacks in this section to eﬀectively
break TDCEA. One attack requires a few number of known
plain texts, and another requires only one.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Two natural images, House and Cameraman, encrypted by TDCEA, when (α,β) = (1, 6), x(0) = 33578/217 ≈ 0.2562, and
µ = 129518/215 ≈ 3.9526. (a) Encrypted House. (b) Encrypted Cameraman.
4.1. Known-plaintext attack 1: getting permutation
matrices as an equivalent key
The insecurity of BRIE against known-/chosen-plaintext at-
tacks is caused by the fact that the ROLR operation is ac-
tually composed of secret permutations of all 8 bits of each
pixel value. As shown in [25], all permutation-only ciphers
are not secure against known-/chosen-plaintext attacks. Ap-
parently, TDCEA falls into the category of permutation-only
ciphers, since the circulation rotations are actually secret per-
mutations of all 64 bits of each 8-pixel block. As a result, if an
attacker knows (or chooses) a number of plain blocks and ci-
pher blocks at the same position, k, it is possible for him to
partially (or even completely) reconstruct the bit permuta-
tion by comparing Mk and M′k. This is the basic principle of
the first type of known-/chosen-plaintext attacks to be dis-
cussed below.
Apparently, for the kth pixel block f (8)(k) and its ci-
pher block f ′(8)(k), the encryption transformation can
be represented by an 8 × 8 permutation matrix Wk =
[Wk(i, j)]
7,7
i=0, j=0, where Wk(i, j) = (i′, j′) denotes the se-
cret position of the plain bit Mk(i, j) in M′k. Since there are
MN/8 diﬀerent blocks, the encryption of f can be repre-
sented by MN/8 permutation matrices: {Wk}MN/8−1k=0 . Once
the attacker gets the MN/8 permutation matrices and their
inverses, {W−1k }MN/8−1k=0 , he can use thesematrices as an equiv-
alent key to decrypt any cipher image encrypted with the
same key.
In [25], a general algorithm was proposed for deriving
the secret permutations (i.e., the permutationmatrices) from
a number of known plain images and their corresponding ci-
pher images. This algorithm depends on the fact that the se-
cret permutations do not change the values of the permuted
elements. As a result, one can compare the values of the ele-
ments of the plain images and the cipher images to reveal the
secret permutations. Here, we show how to optimally realize
the general algorithm for TDCEA and discuss the breaking
performance.
Given n known plain images f0 ∼ fn−1 and their corre-
sponding cipher images f ′0 ∼ f ′n−1, denoting the kth 8 × 8





l,k = [M′l,k(i, j)]7,7i=0, j=0, respectively, the
algorithm of deriving the permutation matrix Wk is de-
scribed as follows.
(i) Step (1a). Calculate a generalized bit matrix M˜k =
[M˜k(i, j)]
7,7
i=0, j=0, where M˜k(i, j) =
∑n−1
l=0 Ml,k(i, j) · 2l.
Apparently, M˜k(i, j) is an n-bit integer.
Note. When n is larger than the word length of the longest
integer (which is 32 or 64 for most computers), it may be im-
possible to store M˜k(i, j) as a normal integer in a computer.
In this case, one has to divide M˜k(i, j) into multiple short in-
tegers for storage and computation (i.e., to use long-integer
techniques). Since the long-integer technique is easy for im-
plementations and n is generally smaller than 32 in most at-
tacking scenarios,3 here we do not pay special attention to
this issue.
(ii) Step (1b). Calculate a generalized bit matrix M˜′k =
[M˜′k(i, j)]
7,7
i=0, j=0, in the same way as Step (1a).
(iii) Step (2). Get multivalued permutation matrix, Ŵk =
[Ŵk(i, j)]
7,7
i=0, j=0, where Ŵk(i, j) = {(i′, j′) | M˜k(i, j) =
M˜′k(i
′, j′)}.
(iv) Step (3). Derive an estimation of the permutation ma-
trixWk from Ŵk.
Apparently, if and only if each element of Ŵk contains
only one pixel position, that is, the measure of every element
of Ŵk is 1, one can uniquely get the permutation matrixWk;
otherwise, only an estimated version W˜k can be derived. In
other words, W˜k =Wk holds if and only if the cardinality of
Ŵk = {Ŵk(0, 0), . . . , Ŵk(7, 7)} is 64, that is, #(Ŵk) = 64.
When #(Ŵk) = P < 64, with ni (i = 1 ∼ P) denoting
the measure of the P diﬀerent elements in Ŵk, one can eas-
ily deduce that there are
∏P
i=1(ni!) possible estimations of
Wk in total. Thus, the task of Step (3) is to determine one
estimated permutation matrix from all possible
∏P
i=1(ni!).
Although many diﬀerent methods can be used to realize Step
(3), the following simple algorithm is enough in most cases
to achieve an acceptable performance.
3As discussed below, the breaking performance is rather good when n ≤
32 (see Figure 5), so one can simply set n = 32 even when n > 32.
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Figure 4: The image Peppers recovered by the first known-plaintext attack. (a) Peppers. (b) Encrypted Peppers. (c) Recovered Peppers via
{W˜k}MN/8−1k=0 . (d) Enhanced Peppers by a 3× 3 median filter.
(i) Initialize all elements of an 8 × 8 flag matrix, Fk =
[Fk(i, j)]
7,7
i=0, j=0, to zeros.
(ii) For i = 0 ∼ 7 and j = 0 ∼ 7, determine the value of
W˜k(i, j) as follows:
(1) find the first position (i′, j′) satisfying Mk(i, j) =
M′k(i
′, j′) and Fk(i′, j′) = 0;
(2) set W˜k(i, j) = (i′, j′) and Fk(i′, j′) = 1.
Note that Step (2) is also incorporated into the above algo-
rithm, which is very useful in reducing the total complexity.
Next, we will see how many known plain images are
enough to achieve an acceptable breaking performance.
Roughly, the larger the n, the less the
∏P
i=1(ni!), the more
accurate the estimated permutation matrix W˜k, and so the
better the breaking performance will be. As a result, by esti-
mating the mathematical expectation of ni, one can concep-
tually derive a lower bound for n. To simplify the following
analyses, we assume that each element inMl,k distributes uni-
formly over {0, 1} and any two elements are independent of
each other. Then, one can see that there are two types of ele-
ments in each Ŵk(i, j):
(i) the only real position, which absolutely occurs;
(ii) other fake positions, each of which occurs in Ŵk(i, j)
with a probability of 1/2n, since any two bits in a bit
matrix are identical with a probability of 1/2.
Thus, it follows that the average cardinality of Ŵk(i, j) is
ni = 1+(64−1)/2n = 1+63/2n, which approaches 1 exponen-
tially as n increases. Generally speaking, when 1+63/2n < 1.5,
that is, about half elements in W˜k are correct, the decryption
performance will be acceptable.4 Solving this inequality, one
has
n ≥ 1 + ⌈ log2 63⌉ = 1 + 5.9773 = 7. (8)
This theoretical result has been verified by experiments as
shown in Figures 4 and 5. Note that the above analysis can
also be derived from the general result given in [25]. Though
the above result is deduced under the assumption that {Ml,k}
is an i.i.d. sequence, it can be qualitatively generalized to
other distributions of {Ml,k}. Our experiments show that the
above theoretical result essentially holds for most natural im-
ages.
For a randomly selected key, (α,β) = (2, 2), x(0) =
33578/217 ≈ 0.2562, µ = 129518/215 ≈ 3.9526, a set of
known plain images (all natural images) are randomly se-
lected for testing. When n = 8, the plain image “Peppers”
(Figure 4a) and its cipher image (Figure 4b) are used to verify
the breaking performance based onMN/8 estimated permu-
tation matrices, {W˜k}MN/8−1k=0 . The recovered plain image is
shown in Figure 4c. It is found that almost all visual informa-
tion contained in the original plain image has been success-
fully recovered, though only 38012/65536 = 58% of plain
pixels are correct in value. With some noise reduction algo-
rithms, one can further enhance the recovered plain image.
One enhanced result with a 3 × 3 median filter is shown in
Figure 4d.
4It is an empirical result drawn from our experiments, which can be
qualitatively explained by the fact that human eyes have a good capability
of rejecting noises in natural images.


















Figure 5: The percentage of correctly recovered pixels, Pc, with re-
spect to the number of known plain images, n0.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of correctly recovered
plain pixels with respect to n, the number of known plain
images. One can see that the breaking performance is good
when n ≥ 8. Also, it is found that the breaking performance
of the natural image is better than the noisy image under the
same condition, which is attributed to the correlation exist-
ing in the natural image for decryption as discussed in [25]. It
can also be observed that the slope of the two lines in Figure 5
are very flat when n ≥ 16, this is also due to the correlation of
the known images (e.g., the MSBs of adjacent pixels are the
same with a high probability).
The complexity of this attack is rather small. For each
block, the time complexity consumed in Step (1a) and Step
(1b) is O(2 · 64 · (n − 1)), and the average complexity in
Step (2) is O(64 · 32), so the total attack complexity is only
O((2 · 64 · (n− 1) + 64 · 32) ·MN/8) = O(16(n + 15)MN).
This known-plaintext attack has two disadvantages: (1)
the number of required known plain images is somewhat
large; (2) with n known plain images of size M × N , this at-
tack can only decrypt cipher images of size not greater than
M×N . In the following subsection, we will introduce another
known-plaintext attack, by which we can get the secret keys
with only one known plain image (but with a larger complex-
ity).
4.2. Known-plaintext attack 2: getting the secret
key from one known plain image
The known-plaintext attack introduced in this subsection
is actually an optimized brute-force attack. By utilizing the
correlation information existing between two consecutive
chaotic states and the control parameter µ, the multiplicative
search of the two subkeys x(0) and µ can be reduced to be the
additive search of two chaotic states x(k) and x(k + 1). This
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Figure 6: C(t) = 64!/(t!(64− t)!) with respect to t.
each guessed chaotic state can be verified by a few number
of 8-pixel blocks, not by the whole known plain image, the
attack complexity can be further reduced.
The basic idea of this attack is based on the following
facts: (1) each permutation matrix Wk is uniquely deter-
mined by the current chaotic state x(k) and the two subkeys
α, β; (2) two consecutive chaotic states x(k) and x(k + 1) sat-
isfy x(k + 1) ≈ µ · x(k) · (1− x(k)). Once an attacker gets the
right values of any two consecutive chaotic states, he can im-
mediately get an estimation of µ, and then completely break
TDCEA if α and β are also known.
To get the right value of a chaotic state x(k) correspond-
ing to the kth bit matrix Mk, one can use the permutation
information existing in Mk and M′k. When there are t 0-bits
and (64− t) 1-bits inMk, one can calculate that the number






In comparison, the number of all possibilities of each permu-
tation matrix is equal to the number of all possible values of
the 3-tuple data (x(k),α,β), which is less than Ns = 217 · 25.
When 5 ≤ t ≤ 59, one has C(t)  Ns (see Figure 6). This
means that the probability that a wrong value of (x(k),α,β)
coincides with W ′k is close to zero, that is, one can exhaus-
tively search all possible values of (x(k),α,β) to find a few
number of candidates of the right value. Apparently, such
an exhaustive searching procedure is optimized when t =
32.
Carrying out the above procedure on two consecutive bit
matrices, one can find some candidates of two consecutive
chaotic states, x(k) = 0.b(17k + 0) · · · b(17k + 16) and x(k +
1) = 0.b(17k+17) · · · b(17k+33). Then, an estimated value
of the subkey µ can be derived as
µ˜ = x(k + 1)
x(k) · (1− x(k)) . (9)
Due to the quantization errors introduced in the finite-
precision arithmetic, generally x(k+1) = µ·x(k)·(1−x(k)),
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so µ˜ = µ. Fortunately, following the error analysis of µ˜ given
in [22, Appendix], it has been shown that when x(k + 1) ≥
2−n (n = 1 ∼ 17), |µ˜ − µ| < 2n+3 · 2−17. For example,
when x(k + 1) ≥ 2−1 = 0.5, one can exhaustively search
24 = 16 values in the neighborhood of µ˜ to find the right
value of µ. To verify whether µ˜ = µ, one can iterate the
logistic map from x(k + 1) until x(MN/8 − 1) and then
check the coincidence between each bit matrix Mi and M′i ,
i = k + 2, . . . ,MN/8 − 1. Once a mismatch occurs, the cur-
rent guessed value is discarded, and the next value is tested.
To minimize the verification complexity, one can check only
a number of chaotic states suﬃciently far from x(k + 1) to
eliminate most (if not all) wrong values of µ˜, and verify a
few left ones by checking all chaotic states from x(k + 2) to
x(MN/8− 1).
The proposed known-plaintext attack can be concretized
step by step as follows.
(i) Step (1). Find the first two consecutive plain blocks
f (8)(k) and f (8)(k + 1), whose corresponding bit ma-
tricesMk andMk+1 both have about 32 0-bits.
Note. Assuming that each bit in Mk distributes uniformly
and independently, one can deduce that
Ps = Prob









where t is the number of nonzero elements of Mk and 0 ≤
s ≤ 32. When s = 4, Ps ≈ 0.7396, which is suﬃciently large
for an attacker to find valid plain-blocks within all theMN/8
blocks.
(ii) Step (2). Exhaustively search all possible values of
(x(k),α,β) and record those coinciding with Mk and
M′k. Assume that m1 candidates are recorded in total:
{xi(k),α∗i ,β∗i }m1−1i=0 .
(iii) Step (3). Search all possible values of x(k + 1) and all
values of (α,β) in {α∗i ,β∗i }m1−1i=0 and record those co-
inciding with Mk+1 and M′k+1. Assume that m2 candi-
dates are recorded in total: {xj(k + 1),α∗∗j ,β∗∗j }m2−1j=0 .
(iv) Step (4). For i = 0 ∼ m1 − 1 and j = 0 ∼ m2 − 1, do
the following operations.
Step (4a). If α∗i = α∗∗j and β∗i = β∗∗j , then cal-
culate µ˜ = xj(k + 1)/xi(k) · (1− xi(k)) and con-
tinue to execute Step (4b); otherwise, go to the
next loop.
Step (4b). Assuming that xj(k + 1) ≥ 2−n, exhaus-
tively search all possible 2n+3 values of µ within the
neighborhood of µ˜. For each searched value, iter-
ate the logistic map from xi(k+1) to xi(MN/8−1).
If every chaotic state xi(l) and (α∗i ,β
∗
i ) agree with
Ml andM′l (l = k+2 ∼MN/8−1), then the attack
completes.
The time complexity of this attack can be calculated as
follows.
Figure 7: The recovered plain image Peppers by the second known-
plaintext attack.
(i) The average complexity of Step (2) is 217 ·25 · (14 ·8+
(1/2) · 8 · 8) < 229.
(ii) The complexity of Step (3) is obviously less than that
of Step (2).
(iii) The average number of exhaustive searching loops in




2n+3 · Prob [2−n ≤ xj(k + 1) < 2−(n−1)], (11)
which is the mathematical expectation of the space
size of the searching neighborhood of µ˜. Consider-
ing the computational complexity for each searching
loop, the average complexity of Step (4) is of order
(m1 ·m2 · Cx/2) · 49MN . Without loss of generality,
assume that xj(k+1) distributes uniformly over the in-
terval [0, 1], that is, Prob[2−n ≤ xj(k + 1) < 2−(n−1)] =
2−n. Thus, Cx =
∑17
n=1 2n+3 ·2−n = 23 ·17 = 136. Then,
the average complexity becomes O(833m1m2MN/2).
Since, in most cases,MN ≤ 4096 · 4096 = 224 andm1,
m2 are generally very small, the complexity is generally
not greater than O(236).
Combining the above results, one concludes that the total
complexity is O(236), which is practically small even for a PC
and much smaller than O(260), the complexity of the simple
brute-force attack shown in Section 3.3.
Figure 7 shows an experimental result of the recovered
plain image “Peppers,” where the fifth and sixth pixel blocks
are chosen to exhaustively search the secret key. As a result,
all chaotic states from x(5) are successfully derived and only
(5 · 8 = 40) leading plain pixels at the left-bottom corner are
not recovered correctly.
5. CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT ATTACKS
Chosen-plaintext attacks are enhanced (and generally
stronger) versions of known-plaintext attacks, with some
intentionally chosen plaintexts and their corresponding ci-
phertexts [28]. In these attacks, the two known-plaintext at-
tacks introduced in the previous section can be significantly
enhanced.
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5.1. Chosen-plaintext attack 1: getting permutation
matrices as an equivalent key
As discussed in Section 4.1, if #(W˜k) = 64, the permutation
matrixWk can be uniquely determined. Apparently, it is easy
to ensure #(W˜k) = 64 by choosing the following six plain
images for all k = 0 ∼MN/8− 1, i = 0 ∼ 7, j = 0 ∼ 7:






























f5 :M5,k(i, j) = (8i + j) mod 2.
(12)
With the above six chosen plain images, #(W˜k) = 64 holds so
allMN/8 permutation matrices can be uniquely determined,
which can then be used to decrypt any cipher image of size
not greater thanMN .
The time complexity of such an attack is of the same or-
der as the known-plaintext attack with n = 6 known plain
images, that is, O(16(6 + 15)MN) = O(336MN).
In fact, due to a special weakness of TDCEA, even two
chosen plain images are enough to completely reconstruct
each 8 × 8 permutation matrix. Recalling the encryption
procedure of TDCEA, one can see that 2D secret rotations
are merely a simple combination of 1D rotations in two di-
rections: 8 horizontal rotations followed by 8 vertical rota-
tions. Such a property makes the division of the 2D secret
rotations possible in chosen-plaintext attacks with only two
plain images. In cryptanalysis, we call such attacks divide-
and-conquer (DAC) attacks. The DAC chosen-plaintext at-
tack can be described as follows.
(i) Break the 8 vertical secret rotations. Choose a plain im-
age f0 as follows: for all k = 0 ∼ MN/8 − 1, f (8)0 (k) =




1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




It is obvious that the 8 horizontal secret rotations have
no influence on the above plain image. That is, the
2D TDCEA is reduced to the 1D BRIE in the verti-
cal direction. Since each column of M0,k has only one
1-bit, by comparing M0,k and M′0,k one can uniquely
get 8 values, sk( j) ( j = 0 ∼ 7), which satisfy M′0,k =
Rotate Y
0,sk( j)
j (M0,k) and serves as the equivalent rota-
tion parameter of the jth column.
(ii) Break the 8 horizontal secret rotations. Choose a plain
image f1 as follows: for all k = 0 ∼MN/8−1, f (8)1 (k) =




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




Since the 8 vertical secret rotations have been obtained
via f0, one can remove all the 8 vertical rotations from
M′1,k to get the intermediate bit matrix M
∗
1,k. Then,
by comparing M∗1,k and M1,k, one can similarly get
another 8 values, rk(i) (i = 0 ∼ 7), where M∗1,k =
Rotate X0,rk(i)i (M1,k). Here, rk(0) ∼ rk(7) are the equiv-
alent rotation parameters of the ith line.
Apparently, after revealing the horizontal and vertical se-
cret rotations, the permutation matrix Wk can be immedi-
ately reconstructed by simply combining the 16 rotations. In
this case, the time complexity is onlyO((4+1+4+8)MN) =
O(17MN).
5.2. Chosen-plaintext attack 2: getting the secret key
In the first chosen-plaintext attack, one can get 16 values,
sk(0) ∼ sk(7) and rk(0) ∼ rk(7), for each pixel block f (8)(k).
Based on the 16 values, the second known-plaintext attack
discussed in Section 4.2 can be dramatically enhanced in
most cases by introducing a much more eﬀective way of de-
riving the 17 secret bits, b(17k + 0) ∼ b(17k + 16), of the
chaotic state x(k).
To simplify the following discussions, create a new vector,
rsk(i) (i = 0 ∼ 15), which satisfies that for all i = 0 ∼ 7,
rsk(i) = rk(i) and for all i = 8 ∼ 15, rsk(i) = sk(i− 8).
Recalling the encryption procedure of TDCEA, it is ob-
vious that the 16 values {rsk(i)}15i=0 have a deterministic rela-
tion with the 17 secret bits b(17k + 0) ∼ b(17k + 16). Such
a relation can be used to facilitate an exhaustive search of
the 17 secret bits, that is, the search of the kth chaotic state
x(k) = 0.b(17k + 0) · · · b(17k + 16).
Considering the fact that Rotate X0,ri = Rotate X1,8−ri ,
Rotate Y 0,sj = Rotate Y 1,8−sj , one can see that for all i = 0 ∼
15, k = 0 ∼ MN/8 − 1, rsk(i) must be a value in the set
S = {α,α + β, 8− α, 8− (α + β)}.
For each guessed value (α˜, β˜), one can determine 16 bits,
denoted by b˜(17k+1) ∼ b˜(17k+16), as estimations of b(17k+
1) ∼ b(17k + 16), as follows: for all i = 1 ∼ 16,
b˜(17k + i) =

0, rsk(i− 1) ∈
{
α˜, 8− α˜},
1, rsk(i− 1) ∈
{
α˜ + β˜, 8− (α˜ + β˜)}. (15)
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Note that the above equation is invalid when α˜ = α˜ + β˜ or
α˜ = 8−(α˜+ β˜), that is, β˜ = 0 or 2α˜+ β˜ = 8. Similarly, one has
another equation for estimating the values of b(17k + 0) ∼
b(17k + 15): for all i = 0 ∼ 15,
b˜(17k + i) =

0, rsk(i) ∈ {α˜, α˜ + β˜},1, rsk(i) ∈ {8− α˜, 8− (α˜ + β˜)}. (16)
The above equation is invalid when α˜ = 4, α˜ + β˜ = 4 or
2α˜ + β˜ = 8.
According to how much information one can get from
{rsk(i)}15i=0, all values of (α˜, β˜) can be divided into the follow-
ing classes in the chosen-plaintext attack.
(C1) α˜ = 4, α˜ + β˜ = 4, β˜ = 0 and 2α˜ + β˜ = 8: b˜(17k +
1) ∼ b˜(17k + 16) and b˜(17k + 0) ∼ b˜(17k + 15) can be
uniquely determined by (15) and (16), respectively, so
all the 17 bits, b˜(17k+0) ∼ b˜(17k+16), can be uniquely
recovered.
There are 12 (C1)-values of (α˜, β˜), as follows: (1, 1),
(1, 2), (1, 4), (1, 5), (2, 1), (2, 3), (2, 5), (3, 3), (3, 4),
(5, 1), (5, 2), (6, 1).
(C2) 4 ∈ {α˜, α˜ + β˜} and β˜ = 0 (which ensures 2α˜ + β˜ = 8):
b˜(17k + 1) ∼ b˜(17k + 16) can be uniquely determined
by (15), but b˜(17k + 0) has to be guessed.5
There are 6 (C2)-values of (α˜, β˜), as follows: (1, 3),
(2, 2), (3, 1), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3).
(C3) α˜ = 4 and β˜ = 0 (which ensures 2α˜ + β˜ = 8): b˜(17k +
0) ∼ b˜(17k + 15) can be uniquely determined by (16),
but b˜(17k + 16) has to be guessed.
There are 6 (C3)-values of (α˜, β˜), as follows: (1, 0),
(2, 0), (3, 0), (5, 0), (6, 0), (7, 0).
(C4) 2α˜ + β˜ = 8: all the 17 bits has to be exhaustively
guessed, as in the second known-plaintext attack dis-
cussed in Section 4.2.
There are 4 (C4)-values of (α˜, β˜), as follows: (1, 6),
(2, 4), (3, 2), (4, 0).
The above four diﬀerent cases correspond to diﬀerent
values of #(S) as follows:
(i) #(S) = 4: (α˜, β˜) is one of the 12 (C1)-values;
(ii) #(S) = 3: (α˜, β˜) is one of the 6 (C2)-values;
(iii) #(S) = 2: (α˜, β˜) is one of the 6 (C3)-values and the
following (C4)-values: {(1, 6), (2, 4), (3, 2)};
(iv) #(S) = 1: (α˜, β˜) = (4, 0) (a (C4)-value).
5Note that b˜(17k + 0) can be uniquely determined in the following two
subcases: (a) when α˜ = 4 and b˜(17k + 1) = 1, one can uniquely determine
b˜(17k + 0) by (16) since α˜ + β˜ = 4; (b) when α˜ = 4 and b˜(17k + 1) = 0,
one can also uniquely determine b˜(17k+0) by (16). The two subcases occur
with a probability of 0.5 when {b(i)} distributes uniformly over {0, 1}.
Since one can guess the value of #(S) by observing the car-
dinality of the set {rsk(0), . . . , rsk(15)} ⊆ S, it is possi-
ble to search (α,β) in part of all possible values to reduce
the attack complexity. Apparently, the success probability
of such a guess is Pe = Prob[S = {rsk(0), . . . , rsk(15)}].
Since the theoretical deduction of Pe is rather diﬃcult,
experiments are performed to test all 217 possible values
of b(17k + 0) ∼ b(17k + 16). It results in that Pe =
122684/217 ≈ 0.936, which is suﬃciently large. Note that
it is easy to further increase the success probability of
the guess, by observing n > 1 blocks at the same time.
In doing so, the success probability will be greater than
P(n)e = 1 − (1 − Pe)n under the assumption that the chaotic
bits for diﬀerent blocks distribute uniformly and indepen-
dently. As n increases, P(n)e will approach 1 exponentially.
In real attacks, even n = 2 is enough in almost all cases,
since P(2)e ≈ 0.996. If all guessed values determined by
#({rsk(0), . . . , rsk(15)}) fail to pass the verification, it means
that the rare event {rsk(0), . . . , rsk(15)} ⊂ S occurs.6 In this
case, one has to continue to exhaustively search all other val-
ues of (α,β).
When the real value of (α,β) belongs to (C1), (C2), (C3)
classes, the complexity of the chosen-plaintext attack will be
much smaller than the complexity of its known-plaintext
counterpart, due to the following reasons:
(i) the exhaustive searching procedure for the 17 bits
of each chaotic state is simplified to be a determin-
istic calculation procedure dominated by (15) and/or
(16);
(ii) the number of guessed values of (α,β) is reduced from
28 to 12 for (C1), 6 for (C2) and (C3);
(iii) some values of (α,β) can be verified by checking
whether or not {rsk(0), . . . , rsk(15)} ⊆ {α˜, α˜ + β˜, 8 −
α˜, 8− (α˜ + β˜)};
(iv) one can intentionally choose the second chaotic state
to ensure x(k + 1) ≥ 0.5, that is, b(17(k + 1) + 0) = 1,
so as to reduce Cx, the average searching complexity of
µ, from 136 to 21+3 = 16;
(v) the exhaustive search of µ can be validated by just com-
paring the calculated chaotic state with the bits derived
by (15) and/or (16).
When the real value of (α,β) belongs to (C4) class, the aver-
age complexity of the chosen-plaintext attack is also smaller
than the one of its known-plaintext counterpart, since the
value of (α,β) can be immediately determined7 with a suﬃ-
ciently high probability, P(n)e ≈ 1, that is, only when the rare
event {rsk(0), . . . , rsk(15)} ⊂ S occurs, one needs to exhaus-
tively search the value of (α,β).
6Note that the occurrence probability is not zero, though it is very close
to zero when n is suﬃciently large.
7If #(S) = 1, then (α,β) ≡ (4, 0); otherwise, one can determine
the value of (α,β) quickly by checking the following three candidates:
(1, 6), (2, 4), (3, 2).
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6. CHOSEN-CIPHERTEXT ATTACKS
Chosen-ciphertext attacks are mirror versions of chosen-
plaintext attacks, in which a cryptanalyst attempts to deter-
mine the secret key from knowledge of plaintexts that cor-
respond to ciphertexts chosen by the attacker [28]. For TD-
CEA, due to the symmetry of the encryption and decryption
procedures, one can carry out chosen-ciphertext attacks, in
very much the same way as the chosen-plaintext attacks dis-
cussed in Section 5.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the security of the recently proposed encryp-
tion scheme for multimedia transmission, called TDCEA
[1, 2], has been analyzed carefully. Some defects existing
in TDCEA have been found and diagnosed. Two methods
of known-plaintext attacks and their chosen-plaintext at-
tack counterparts have been proposed to break the scheme.
In addition, a chosen-ciphertext attack has been mentioned
briefly. Both theoretical and experimental analyses have been
given to demonstrate the defects of TDCEA and to verify the
feasibility of the proposed known-plaintext attacks. In con-
clusion, TDCEA is not suggested for applications that require
a high level of security level.
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